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THE FUTURE OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW IN LATIN
AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR MODEL CODES
JUAN JAVIER DEL GRANADO* AND M.C. MIROW t

INTRODUCTION

As an academic discipline within legal scholarship, law and economics-which had been largely confined to the Anglo-American common-law
world-has made considerable inroads in civil-law countries during the last
decade of the twentieth century and first decade of the twenty-first century.' Nonetheless, what has been a renewing force in legal scholarship in
North America has fared less well in northwest Europe, or at least south of
the Rio Grande and in southwest Europe. 2 Why has the economic approach
to law been so successful in the Anglo-American common-law world, and
less so in European and Latin American countries rooted in civil-law tradition? This paper suggests that a divergence in attitudes toward legal science
among civil-law and common-law lawyers accounts for the comparative
success of law and economics in both legal systems, an idea we will expand upon throughout this study. This paper suggests that if the economic
approach to law is to have an impact within the legal and social environment of Latin American countries, law and economics must adapt to Latin
America, instead of expecting Latin America to adapt to law and econom* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law, and Director of the Law and Economics Program, American Justice School of Law; Director, Latin American and Caribbean Law and
Economics Center, George Mason University School of Law; Professor of Law and Economics at the
Instituto Tecnolrgico Aut6nomo de Mexico.
t Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law.
I. For the past four decades, the world of legal scholarship has been under siege from the forces
of law and economics. See James L. Huffman, From Legal History to Legal Theory: Or is it the Other
Way Around?, 40 TULSA L. REV. 579, 580 (2005) (discussing the penetration of law and economics and
critical legal studies into the classroom over the last thirty years). In Latin America, the movement has
barely begun. Law and Economics started in the United States, and from there spread to Europe and
Latin America. See JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGALECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY (2007) (placing the discipline within American
jurisprudence); John Linarelli, Law and Economics: The InternationalLibrary of Critical Writings in
Economics, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 509, 509-10 (1999) (book review) (providing a brief history of the
discipline).
2. Law and economics has been part of the curricula for several decades now in most AngloAmerican law schools but, as an academic discipline, it remains notoriously absent from the curricula in
most Latin American law schools.
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ics. In particular, this paper proposes that we must venture on an unconventional intellectual odyssey for common-law scholars: the drafting of an
ALACDE 3 model law and economics civil and commercial code for Latin
American countries as a way of bringing academe and the legal community
south of the Rio Grande into the law and economics fold.
An alternative viewpoint is offered by Thomas S. Ulen and Nuno M.
Garoupa. 4 They argue that widely-differing levels of competitiveness in
higher legal education in the United States and Europe explain differences
in the reception of law and economics. These two viewpoints are interrelated. We believe that, within the civil-law world, law and economics is
more likely to become dominant in Latin America than in Europe because
the change-resisting hand of the old guard is less heavy. 5 The myriad systematic and endemic weaknesses of large public universities in Latin
America has opened the doors of academe to fast-growing competition
6
from new private universities.
As a direct result of the region's present state of development, law
schools in Latin America and the Caribbean are institutionally open to
change. If the instrument of change wears local clothing, successful introduction becomes even more likely. Hence, we have chosen to use a codea code can be adopted as a return to Latin America's own intellectual traditions. Therefore, we blend Ulen and Garoupa's wisdom with our own in
suggesting a new-generation model law and economics civil and commercial code for Latin America.
I.

LAW AND ECONOMICS IN LATIN AMERICA

Comparative law, with a longer history as an academic discipline in
many parts of the world, remains a relatively minor field in the United

3. Established in 1995, the Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics Association
(ALACDE) groups all the main countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Its dual mission is to
promote awareness, advancement, and development of legal research employing the tools of economic
analysis, and to keep law schools in Latin America and the Caribbean abreast of the latest findings and
groundbreaking work in the field. The organization maintains its own Web site (http://www.alacde.org)
and holds an annual meeting at varying locations throughout the area.
4. Thomas S. Ulen & Nuno Garoupa, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in
Europe and the United States (Univ. of Ill. Law and Econ. Research Paper No. LE07-009, 2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=972360.
5. The relative malleability of Latin America is demonstrated by Chile's remarkable and successful free-market revolution. Chile adopted free-market reforms a generation before Europe.
6. See Daniel C. Levy, Latin America's Private Universities: How Successful Are They? 29
COMP. EDUC. REv. 440 (1985) (comparing Europe to Latin America in reliance on public institutions to
perform the tasks of higher education).
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States. 7 In many ways, law and economics is a still-young field of research,
although its progress has been stunningly swift and many scholars now
even speak of a new law and economics. 8 Comparative law and economics,
as defined by Ugo Mattei, is even a newer field.9 In the civil-law tradition,
it is typical to speak of the comparative method, as opposed to the scientific
method-by which something entirely different is meant from scientific
rigor as it is understood in North America, where the proper significance of
scientific methodology is clearly identified with the experimental method
and the principle of verifiability. 10 The sole test of a theory is whether it
works: the most important aspect is whether the theoretical predictions fit
the experimental facts, rather than the overall plausibility of the underlying
assumptions." 1 In the North, the social sciences (of which economic science is a prominent example) struggle to maintain their status as scientific
fields of inquiry. Their basis is often of a more theoretical nature, and establishing an empirical basis for the social sciences is more elusive and
imprecise than, say, in physical, chemical, and biological oceanographywhich an ocean of empirical evidence supports. In the South, on the other
hand, "legal science" is a term uncritically accepted, more akin to systematic legal knowledge. Legal science is an autonomous body of knowledge
in its own magisterial and systematic form, and there is less tension with
the epistemological underpinnings of the discipline.12
Legal science, as it is understood in the South, is redolent of the scientific rationalism incubated on the European continent since the Enlightenment. Some of the obvious flowerings of this long-standing ratiocinative
7. See Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of
the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 672 (2002) (discussing the origins of comparative law
in the United States within the last five decades).
8. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998) (discussing
the growing influence of a number of scholars in this field of law).
9. See generally UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997). See also Catherine
A. Rogers, Gulliver's Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of Comparative Law, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 149 (1998) (reviewing MATTEI, supra, and providing an overview of Mattei's view of Law and
Economics). For further discussion of the evolution of comparative law and economic theory, see
Horacio Spector, Fairness and Welfare from a Comparative Law Perspective, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
521 (2004).
10. See Rogers, supra note 9, at 161-73 (discussing comparative and scientific methodology).
11. In economic science, a classic statement is Milton Friedman's 1953 methodological essay, in
MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3-43

(1953).
12. See Horacio Spector, The Future of Legal Science in Civil Law Systems, 65 LA. L. REV. 255
(2004) (discussing social science, physical science, and legal science, and the effect of science in the
variance of theoretical explanations in civilian and common-law scholarship). The North American
legal academy appears to be embracing empirical approaches. The 2006 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools was conducted under the theme "Empirical Scholarship: What Should
We Study and How Should We Study It." See Association of American Law Schools, Meeting Theme,
http://www.aals.org/am2006/theme.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
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tradition stem from the work of natural lawyers, who, back in the seventeenth century, grafted the idea of a science of law 13 on the centuries-old
civilian tradition in the ius commune of scholarly doctrine as a subsidiary
source of legal authority. 14 This emphasis on rationalism and abstract
thought has left a lasting impression within the orbit of continental European legal culture. Legal education on the continent, which derives from
the reception of Roman law at Europe's great universities, is a traditionally
academic discipline taught by a professorial staff. As a result, legal scholarship continues in continental Europe and Latin America largely in a theoretical rationalist framework, through national codification all the way
15
down to legal positivism in the law today.
Within the confines of Anglo-American legal culture, on the other
hand, legal education remained-well into the last quarter of the nineteenth
century-in the hands of legal practitioners. Moreover, legal education
remained in the empirical mould of legal apprenticeship: the British philosophical tradition of empiricism prevailed. In the empirical tradition,
anything not measurable, quantifiable, or scientifically verifiable is regarded as meaningless. Anglo-American philosophers, anchored by their
empiricism, are pragmatists. Within Anglo-American academic circles, the
dominant paradigm of law and economics has always been open to revision
in the light of experience. Law and economics, in particular, developed
from the extreme empiricism of logical positivism. Under the influence of
members of the Vienna Circle, who espoused an anti-metaphysical and
scientific-minded philosophy, the "ordinalist revolution" of the 1930s established a form of logical positivism as the dominant philosophy of economics.

16

In North America, until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, law
had not been considered a science, but an art, "the art of the lawyer and the
art of the judge,"' 17 until a German-inspired brand of systematic legal science was successfully transplanted into the case method of the common
law by scholars, such as Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell' 8; much of
13. See M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 95, 96 (1986).
14. See id. at 96-99 (discussing how early modem jurists rejected medieval customs in favor of
Roman civil sources as authority).
15. For a discussion of the history and development of legal scholarship and education in Latin
America, see ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, LATIN AMERICAN LAWYERS: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
102-04 (2006).
16. Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22
J. ECON. LITERATURE 507, 521-22 (1984).

17. Jerome Frank, Why not a ClinicalLawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907, 923 (1933).
18. See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN

LEGAL EDUCATION (1994) (contextualizing Langell's accomplishments); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's
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this thrust was undone by legal realism, led by proto-realists such as Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who demystified judge-made law and, under the
influence of a new wave of German jurisprudence, 19 pointed to the indeterminate nature of legal institutions and the social, political, and business
interests and individual preferences that were behind legal decisions. 2 0
Law and economics has had its major impact largely because of the
disarray of legal scholarship in North America, after the legal realists undid
much of the edifice constructed by the Langdellians with their aspiration to
legal science. 2 1 By strengthening the empirical claims made for legal scholarship and incorporating the economic methodology to the study of law
(through the application of not just cost-benefit analysis, but also statistics,
price theory, the modem assumption of ordinal utility and revealed preference, transaction cost economics, and blackboard game theory) the new
economic approach to law is beginning to look like an evermore attractive
option to many legal scholars. 22
However, the renewed claims to legal science 23 made by law and economics in Anglo-America may have less impact on legal scholars in
Europe and Latin America. 24 For one thing, law and economics must compete with other schools of legal thought, such as contemporary legal soci-

Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 32-34 (1983). See also Michael H. Hoeflich, Savigny and His AngloAmerican Disciples, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 17, 18-23 (1989) (discussing the impact of German scholar
Savigny on creative jurists and legal scholars in the United States).
19. This wave of German jurisprudence is evidenced in RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS
TO AN END 33 (Isaac Husik trans., Augustus M. Kelly Publishers 1968) (1877). See also LAPIANA,
supra note 18, at 110-22; James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German FreeLaw Movement as the
Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399 (1987); Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed:
Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195 (1994) (reviewing THE RECEPTION OF
CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD, 1820-1920 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993) and DER
EINFLUSS

DEUTSCHER

EMIGRANTEN

AUF

DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG

IN

DEN

USA

UND

IN

DEUTSCHLAND (Marcus Lutter, Ernst C. Stiefel & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1993)) (examining legal
transplants of civil law to common law).
20. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); see also
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at
131-71 (1983).
21. See Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 914-17 (suggesting that legal scholarship is
becoming more scientific as a shift in paradigm from Langdellian doctrine).
22. Today Anglo-American scholars glimpse the possibility of legal theory as a unified field of
social science. See Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & SOC'Y 50 (1995).
23. Some Latin American legal scholars confuse law and economics with a current subject taught
in law schools: derecho econdmico or direito econ6mico, a legal discipline that covers the full panoply
of economic regulation and state-centric economic policies; this academic discipline unblushingly
endorses protectionism and grants a seal of approval to ill-conceived forms of state intervention.
24. Thomas S. Ulen and Nuno Garoupa argue that widely-differing levels of competitiveness in
higher and legal education in the United States and Europe explain differences in the reception of law
and economics. Ulen & Garoupa, supra note 4, at 14-60.
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ology, which has a more rationalist, and less empirical foundation 25-- or
with more philosophically-inspired schools of legal thought, such as legal
hermeneutics. 26 Also, with their true rationalist turn of mind, the interests
of European and Latin American legal scholars may lie in the more abstract, and less pragmatic, realms of speculation of legal philosophy. The
27
economic approach is not seen as necessarily furthering jurisprudence.
Legal science is already thought of as an autonomous subject, inviting
magisterial and systematic conceptual elaboration. This view is easily supported in a legal system where law has been the subject of written and systematic codification, where legal doctrines are extensively cross-referenced
and indexed, and where legal decisions are based on a legal doctrine that is
itself the subject of systematic treatment in secondary literature, such as
legal treatises, which are understood to be sources of legal authority.2 8
II.

ARGUING FOR THE CODE

Accordingly, legal scholars may ask themselves what alternative approaches to the legal order would look like from an economic point of
view. Legal scholars in the Anglo-American common law can overlook the
connection between particular ordinances and the underlying framework of
justice or order. A concrete embodiment of the fruits of basic law and economics scholarship is necessary for the economic approach to be fully appreciated in Latin American civil law. For law and economics not to
offend, not to appear alien, it must be redesigned in line with civilian methodology. Although the idea of a unified codification may seem counterintuitive to the common-law attomey, 2 9 it is familiar to the civil-law attorney
whose domestic private law is already codified, and for whom "civil code"
and "civil law" are interchangeable terms. 30 An ALACDE model civil and
commercial code will make the economic analysis of law acceptable to a
25. See generally John P. McCormick, Max Weber and Jirgen Habermas: The Sociology and
Philosophy of Law During Crises of the State, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 297 (1997) (discussing legal
sociology).
26. See generally loannis S. Papadopoulos & Mark Tushnet, Legal Hermeneutics at a Crossroads:
Giuseppe Zaccaria 's Questionni de Interpretazione(1996), 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 261 (2000)
(discussing legal hermeneutics).
27. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 118-20

(2006) (criticizing the instrumental nature of law and economics).
28. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 57-60 (2d ed. 1985).

29. See generally Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law
World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435 (2000) (discussing codification in civil- and common-law systems, and
addressing the traditional notion that common-law systems are uncodified).
30. Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil Code or Civil Law?-Towards a New European Private Law, 20
SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 217, 219-20 (1994).
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new generation of Latin American lawyers, judges, and legal scholars as
the new scholarship is recast in the familiar moulds of the civil law. Nothing excites civilian lawyers more than commissions for codification. 3 1 Law
and economics must adapt to Latin America. Our suggested adaptation is
the use of codification.
Law and economics in the South must ape the success of Langdellians
in the North, when they were able to transplant legal ideas of systematic
legal science from a civil-law mould into a common-law mould. Thus, at
the end of the nineteenth century, a bright young generation of technocrats
in the United States who were well-connected and well-educated were able
to pass off the systematization (that is, the logical ordering together) of all
laws-a characteristic of the civil-law tradition-as a scientific ordering
together of case law, embodied in currently reported opinions of North
American courts. 32 In the same way, a successful adoption of law and economics must recast the economic understanding of law into an ALACDE
model civil and commercial code for Latin American countries. The impulse toward technocratic professionalism in Latin America provides just
the right environment to reward such an initiative. 33 If this initiative is
taken by ALACDE, there is even the possibility that a Latin American
country might adopt the new codes or refer to their provisions in the process of revising codes. Latin American countries are anxious to improve the
accountability and efficiency of government as well as to reduce corrup-

31. Unfortunately there is no perfect analog for the real-world importance of codification in the
common law. However, the Uniform Commercial Code is a useful comparison. The U.C.C. was drafted
by two groups, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the academic
American Law Institute. Now the U.C.C. provides the entire United States with the ability to easily do
business across state lines secure in the almost uniform legal rules regarding commercial transactions.
The importance of commissions for codification in civil-law countries may also be compared to the
power of common-law judges. In common-law systems, judicial decisions are a direct source of law. In
the civil-law systems, such as those that exist in Latin America, legal scholarship is a direct source of
legal authority. Central to this authoritative legal scholarship is a systematic restatement of private law,
embodied in a civil and commercial code, enacted by the legislature.
32. See LAPIANA, supra note 18, at 55-131.
33. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 17-31, 202-16
(2002) [hereinafter DEZALAY & GARTH, PALACE WARS]; Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Patterns of
Foreign Legal Investment and State Transformation in Latin America, in LEGAL CULTURE INTHE AGE
OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE 489-98 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio
Prrez-Perdomo eds., 2003) [hereinafter LEGAL CULTURE]; Larissa Adler Lomnitz & Rodrigo Salazar,
Cultural Elements in the Practice of Law in Mexico: Informal Networks in a Formal System, in
GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL

ORTHODOXY 240-46 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002); Sergio L6pez-Ayll6n & Hector
Fix-Fierro, "Faraway, So Close! ": The Rule of Law and Legal Change in Mexico, 1970-2000, in
LEGAL CULTURE, supra, at 319-27; ROGELIO PtREZ-PERDOMO, LATIN AMERICAN LAWYERS: A
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 120-23 (2006); Rogelio P6rez-Perdomo & Lawrence Friedman, Latin
Legal Cultures in the Age of Globalization, in LEGAL CULTURE, supra, at 3-12.
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tion, and are willing to undergo very substantial restructuring to improve
the efficiency of their legal systems, recognizing its value for achieving
34
sustainable economic growth.
The Chicago program in Chile after 1973 was achieved at a cost of detention, torture, and assassination. 35 However much this program provided
an inspiration for nations around the world to chuck the old economic
model and adopt free-market and free-trade policies-echoes of Chileanstyle economics survive around the world to this day-the terrible things
that were done cloaked economic-inspired reform in Latin America in a
pallor of illegitimacy. Today, democracy is thriving across Latin America
and a new generation of technopols 36 shares a common dream to integrate
their oft-beleaguered nations into global commodity and financial markets. 37 Today, democracy has also produced new populist regimes prone to
socialist reforms and dictatorial power that make positive change even
more compelling. All who seek such change hope this may be accomplished by more democratic means, perhaps by adopting law and economics civil and commercial codes. At the very least, an ALACDE model civil
and commercial code should provoke some needed debate about the economic analysis of law. The ALACDE codes would infuse economics into
the language of private law in Latin America, 38 while simultaneously making the most basic insights of law and economics more our own.
Everybody agrees that law must change and develop in the twentyfirst century, except when this change and development involves the ex-

34. For further discussion of legal reforms in Latin America to deal with corruption, accountability, and economic issues, see LINN A. HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); Edgardo Buscaglia &

Jan van Dijk, Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector, 3 FORUM ON CRIME &
SOC'Y 3 (2003); Eric Heyer, Note, Latin American State Secrecy and Mexico's Transparency Law, 38
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 437, 440-43 (2006) (discussing reforms, corruption, and public accountability); Linn Hammergren, Fifteen Years of Judicial Reform in Latin America: Where We Are and Why
We Haven't Made More Progress (Mar. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.pogar
.org/publications/judiciary/linn2/latin.pdf (discussing political reforms).
35.

JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN

AMERICA 187-90 (1980).
36. See generally Jorge I. Dominguez, Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s, in TECHNOPOLS: FREEING POLITICS AND MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990s,
at 1-49 (Jorge I. Dominguez ed., 1997).
37. See generally id. (discussing the impact and role of technopols on how many Latin American
countries have moved toward greater global commodity by abandoning authoritarian regimes and statedirected economic strategies for democratized politics and freer markets).
38. Although all law and economics scholars would agree that economics is relevant to the study
of law, there is disagreement as to the proper role of economics in the analysis of the law. Many scholars may actively disagree with a project that seeks to replace the jargon of the law with that of economics.
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pansion of North American legal hegemony beyond its own borders. 39
This, of course, is creeping Americanization and is to be fiercely resisted.
With paranoia about the "Americanization of European legal culture" running rampant, European legal scholars are geared to preventing vagabond
and debased American legal thinking from flooding their shores. 40 In this
vein, Ugo Mattei has pointed to Reinhard Zimmermann's use of the authority of Roman law to cope with the fear of the "Americanisation of European law."'4 1 In Mattei's words, Zimmermann "goes so far as to suggest
that the common law is nothing more than a modernized (and corrupted)
evolution of Roman law."'4 2 In much the same way that the German legal
theoretician Friedrich Carl von Savigny feared the hegemony of the French
revolutionary ideology of codification, 4 3 modern European legal scholars
resent the relationship between North American hegemony and law and
economics.
What we propose is far from pushing for the "Anglo-Americanization
of Latin American law." Instead, in adopting the new paradigm of law and
economics, Latin Americans will make it over; much in the way Langdell
ripped apart civil-law legal science and continental attempts to rationalize
whole systems of law by codification and refashioned a common-law legal
science based on the case method. 44 Scholars of Latin America will take
the best North American legal scholarship over and rethink and refashion it
into a new legal science, within the vein of the Latin American tradition of
intellectual critique as well as academic scholarship, to meet the new demands of development in emerging Latin American economies. 45
39. See Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383-87 (2003).
40. See Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 44 (1993)
(discussing how the intrusiveness of law may be particularly American, and the how this intrusiveness
is viewed as "Americanization").
41. Ugo Mattei, The Issue of European Civil Codification and Legal Scholarship: Biases, Strategies and Developments, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 883, 886-87 (1998).
42. Id. at 886. Zimmermann made this point in Der europdishe Carakterdes englischen Rechts.
Id. at 886 n.13 (citing Reinhardt Zimmermann, Der europdishe Carakter des englischen Rechts: Historische Verbindungen zwischen civil law und common law, 1993 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EUROPAISCHES
PRIVATRECHT 4).
43. See id. at 884-85. On Savigny, see PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 115-23
(1999).
44. See generally LAPIANA, supra note 18.
45. Much of the work done in law and economics to date focuses on the developed world. The
work done on the developing world has been more limited. Nonetheless, although it has turned in
meager results to date, the prospects for the success of the field could hardly be brighter. The present
state of knowledge is at a sort of "tipping point." Law and economics is now in a position to co-opt
civilian methodology, where civil-trained legal scholars will be able to undertake a searching inquiry of
the private legal order (el ordenamientojuridico,1'ordrejuridique,die Rechtsordnung). As a result, the
immediate future augurs well for the prospects of the economic analysis of law in developing countries.
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The crux of ALACDE's overall strategy must lie in a return to the
study and use of Roman law, with an eye toward introducing law and economics into Latin America. Some Latin American legal scholars may object that Roman law scholarship is a thing of the past, but nothing could be
further from the truth. Nothing would be left of civil law if we removed
Roman law. Roman law is a well-worn but still-useful tool, which should
serve as a paradigm, or model, for modern legal systems. An ALACDE
model civil and commercial code will be a conscious project to restate Roman law's usefulness for coping with today's problems. As an almostperfect private law system, Roman law is eminently amenable to a state-ofthe-art fusion with law and economics. 4 6 Through our project, Roman law
will renew itself. The central claim of law and economics-that the common law is efficient-has a corollary in the efficiency of Roman law. Latin
American legal scholars can turn to a long and resilient tradition of Roman
law within their own legal system, without legal transplants. Accordingly,
an ALACDE model civil and commercial code will restate Roman law for
Latin American countries.
Roman legal scholarship in Latin America will be undergirded by a
powerful new approach--or rather, law and economics scholars will work
toward the renewal of a very old tradition. Under our proposal, somewhat
like Savigny's undertaking, 47 a vast (and unheralded) collaboration between law and economics scholars and legal historians will place our efforts squarely within the civilian tradition that we have inherited. Two
seemingly incongruous academic disciplines-rational choice theory and
area studies 4 8-will be brought together in a (sometimes uneasy) mix of
universal and empirically verifiable explanations with a historian's eye for
contextual detail. 4 9 Sensitivity to what drives a particular legal culture is
vital to a project meant for pedagogic purposes or for generating interest in
law and economics among a new generation of Latin American lawyers,

46. Obviously the Roman law of personal status is an historical anachronism that long ago outlived its purpose.
47. The nineteenth century German historical school belongs in the rear guard of European Romanticism. It was a reaction to the turmoil of the French Revolution, the unrelieved rationalism of the
Enlightenment, and the onset of the Industrial Revolution.
48. Many Latin American and Caribbean scholars, perhaps as "native anthropologists," are impatient with much work in Latin American studies at U.S. universities. Rather than funding area-studies
programs, U.S. universities ought to encourage the development of scholarship in Latin America itself.
That is what the ALACDE codes project would presuppose.
49. Rational choice theory and area-studies programs go their incommensurable ways. It seems to
stretch a bit far that we can present penetrating arguments about diverse matters in disparate, sometimes
antithetical, fields. However, we must reconcile rational-choice inspired law and economics with the
need for inter-cultural awareness.
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judges, and legal scholars. 50 May we be inspired to bring Latin America
law to the cutting edge of twenty-first century legal science, and move past
the ultimate monument of nineteenth century civilian legal science, the
German Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch of 1900. We believe that, within the
civil-law world, Latin Americans may take the lead and pull away from
Europeans in this emerging legal science.
It is our hope that this timely merger between traditionally separate
academic fields-Roman law and law and economics-may help to heal
the bitter rift between economic and civilian legal scholarship. Today in
Latin America, many scholars view with skepticism the bitter rift that divides the traditional and doctrinaire approaches to legal studies and the
application of economic analysis to law, which is preoccupied with the
consequences of laws and judicial decisions in a variety of fields. One such
scholar, Alfredo Bullard-whose backyard research has come to resemble
that of his Peruvian compatriot Hernando de Soto-has observed, as he has
put it, that Latin American law is "schizophrenic" in its doctrinaire reliance
on formal legal categories. 5 1 Rather than "schizophrenic," we would use
another adjective: "path dependent"(economic jargon for the idea that history determines the outcome of legal development). 52 Latin American law
has become overlaid with an unnecessary degree of legal formalism
through history. After the European enlightenment, civilian legal science
departed from the pragmatic stance of Roman lawyers and the humanist
concerns of the late Scholastic pandectists. The rationalist turn of mind of
civilian lawyers transposed legal reasoning into a jurisprudence of legal
concepts, quite contrary to the humanist turn of mind of the Peninsular and
American Luso-Iberian legal tradition. 53 During the nineteenth century,
moreover, French sociological jurisprudence reinforced the belief that the
law was intelligible and could be reduced to a scientific system. In Germany, during the twentieth century die Freirechtsbewegung(the free law
50. The redactors will be legal historians and the drafters will be economic-minded legal scholars.
The ALACDE model law and economics civil and commercial codes will show sensitivity to the nuances of the legal culture in which Latin American lawyers, judges and legal scholars operate.
51. See ALFREDO BULLARD GONZALES, DERECHO Y ECONOMIA, EL ANALISIS ECON6MICO DE LAS
INSTITUCIONES LEGALES [LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS]

(2003). Hernando de Soto has served as an economist for the GATT, president of the Executive Committee of the Copper Exporting Countries, and as governor of Peru's Central Reserve Bank. See Hernando de Soto, Property, People, and Prosperity: Address to the Houston World Affairs Council, 27
HOUST. J. INT'L L. 467, 467 n.* (2005) (listing de Soto's biographical information).
52. See JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE
(1991) (tracing the origins of modem contract doctrine back to the late Scholastic philosophers).
53. See JUAN JAVIER DEL GRANADO, CONTROVERSIA DE IMPERIO LEGIS ET EMBLEMATA DE
ORIGINI IURIS (2003) (emphasizing the humanist strands within late Scholastic writings, largely overlooked by twentieth-century neo-Thomist readings).
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movement) would oppose and expose the absurdity der bislang vorherrschenden technischen Begriffsjurisprudenz, much as the legal realists in the
United States opposed the notion of a pristine legal science and recognized
the confluence of real-world forces at work in legal decisions. In Latin
America during the twenty-first century, it falls upon the proponents of the
economic analysis of law, who take a consequentialist approach to legal
scholarship, to break free from the grip of excessive legal formalism.
III. DEFENDING THE PRIVATE LEGAL ORDER

Accordingly, one of the most important tenets of the economic analysis of law-that the common law is efficient 54-will be rethought into its
civilian counterpart-that the Roman law is efficient. Paul Rubin has recently surveyed the ongoing debate in law and economics regarding the
efficiency of the common law. Many different explanations have been proposed, from evolutionary models to Hayekian arguments. 55 One that has
never been articulated by common-law scholars is that what tends to be
efficient, however, is the private legal order (el ordenamiento juridico,
l'ordrejuridique, die Rechtsordnung) of the common law (except perhaps
an unrecognized contribution to this debate by Richard Epstein). 56 This
paper argues that the system of private law tends to be more efficient as
common-law/Roman-law judges make their decisions cohere with what is
already settled by the existing legal order. Of course, an assertion that such
logical or analogical coherence (or autopoesis) is a necessary proposition of
the legal order may be a civilian thought, quite alien or extraneous to common-law thinking. Yet, that this is the true explanation of the overall efficiency of the private legal system becomes evident if we look at the legal
order from the civil-law perspective, which an ALACDE model civil and
commercial code will open up for us. 57 The common law and Roman law
are efficient, simply put, because we are dealing with systems of private
law.

54. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25-26, 573-75 & n.1 (6th
ed. 2003).
55. Paul H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 19 (2005).

56. See RICHARD A.

EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD

(1995). As a reward for his

considerable efforts, Epstein has even been accused, in jest, of having a Napoleonic complex. See John
Harrison, Richard Epstein's Big Picture, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 837, 864 (1996) (reviewing EPSTEIN,
supra).
57. What tends to efficiency is the legal order of the common law/Roman law, a system of law
that recognizes and upholds private property and contractual exchange, with an ability to promote
internal financial intermediation to support wealth creation.
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Why is the Roman law efficient? The legal order does not embody the
civil law-as many in the North would have it-as a formalistic system
along the lines of the axiomatic and deductive reasoning postulated by the
natural lawyers. Nor does it embody the procedural instrumentalism of das
Postulat der Einheit der Rechtsordnung of German law, with its tone of
social-scientific rationality at its blandest and most perfectly value-neutral.
More modestly and simply, codifications of civil law in Latin America
have a coherence-not so much a geometry or rigorous instrumental precision-that is based on the Roman law: the Roman law as the be-all and
end-all of the civil law, the accumulated wisdom and experience of the
Roman people for over a thousand years, the embodiment of a model private law system.
Codification on the continent has been in disrepute since Natalino Irti
suggested that Europe was in an era of "de-codification." 5 8 According to
Professor Irti's positive assessment, codes no longer are comprehensive
statements of European private law. Special legislation creates microsystems of law that do not fit into the existing order of private law. This
plurality of micro-systems, based on legal principles-which are sui
generis-have left the civil code relegated to the margins. Codes become
just one more micro-system among the others. "What is law?" becomes
entirely unanswerable, a heretical affront to a civilian mindset. The only
point of convergence between the various micro-systems of law, which
differ ideologically and methodologically and clash occasionally, is the law
of the Constitution. Perhaps only this one point of convergence in public
law remains. Accordingly, civil and commercial codes in Europe are demoted to the category of residual laws. The Constitution is suddenly left
front and center, and private law, cut out at the core of the civilian legal
system. 59 The whole concept of the private legal order becomes a pass6
notion.
Another advocate takes the decline of codification beyond the
Savignian romantic brand of criticism to German codification als ein "undeutsches" Gebilde ohne Volksgeist. Rather than criticizing codification for
exerting a stultifying effect upon the growth of the law, Pio Caroni applies
Marxist critical theory (akin to critical legal studies in the United States,
although he himself might object to this characterization of his ideologyunmasking activity). Codifications simply serve as a way to obfuscate and

58. NATALINO IRTI, LA EDAD DE LA DESCODIFICACION (Luis Rojo Ajuria trans., Bosch ed. 1992)
(1979); NATALITO IRTI, NICHILISMO GIURIDICO [LEGAL NIHILISM] (2004).
59. On the constitutionalization of civil-law systems, see Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism
Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1 (2006).
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cloud what might be the very simple and real social interests that must
inform the law: the complex but intuitively appealing mix of social policies, commonly identified as the principled basis for the social-democratic
notion of the welfare state. 60 According to Professor Caroni's assessment,
the relentless emphasis of French revolutionary ideology and even of German legal science on making the law more accessible, clarifying ambiguities, and permitting reform is nothing short of a devious cover-a thick
grey smoke screen in order to evade, deny, and otherwise shield and protect
the shoddy self-interests of the money-obsessed, petty bourgeoisie. Professor Caroni's unconvincing, critical legal platitudes purport to "explain"
how the legal order embodied in private law codes, as legal instrumentalities, shut out the social interests that undergird a more interventionist, welfare-state approach to the economy-perhaps because of the very
unrealistic and unrealizable nature of its demands.
The criticism of the so-called bourgeois values of French-derivative
civil law has long been fashionable in civilian legal circles. During the
nineteenth century, the sociological jurisprudence d'cole de Bordeaux
counter-posed a society of mutual cooperation, ownership, and control to a
capitalist and individualist form of society based on private property, giving pseudo-scientific credence to an ethos of solidarity. Accordingly, in
Latin America, especially in the years after the October Revolution of
1917, legal scholars sounded a call for the socialization of private law.
Socialistic ideals held that to ensure the flowering of society, capitalism
had to be tamed and harnessed towards social objectives. Accordingly,
legal scholars established the legal doctrines of the social function of private property, the social function of contracts, and notion that the corporations should apply their assets for social purposes rather than for the private
profit of owners. In Latin America, the pendulum-like nature of formalist
legal interpretation swung from absolute concepts of private property, 6 1 the
62
will of the contracting parties as having the force of law between parties,
and business entities as juridical persons, to an equally abstract concept
tagged with a social function or purpose. Later, an attempt was put forth to
turn the private legal order on its head, through a sweeping constitutionalization of private law.
60. See, e.g., PIO

CARONI, PRIVATRECHT: EINE SOZIALHISTORISCHE EINFCJHRUNG 58-61 (1988);
SOBRE LA HISTORIA DE LA CODIFICACI6N (Aquilino Iglesia

PIO CARONI, LECCIONES CATALANAS

Ferreir6s trans., Marcial Pons ed. 1996) (1991); see also CSABA VARGA, CODIFICATION AS A SOCIOHISTORICAL PHENOMENON (Sdindor Eszenyi et al. trans., 1991) (discussing codification as an exercise
of state power).
61. Such as those property rights granted in France, as seen, for example, in CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.]
art. 544 (Fr.).
62. Again, as seen in the French system. C. CIV. art. 1134 (Fr.).
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In practice, the core system of codified private civil and commercial
law has proven remarkably stable and resilient. Although Latin American
constitutions have created a virtual panoply of positive rights and economic
entitlements, a so-called doctrine of mittelbare Drittwirkung of fundamental rights 63 has been slow to develop. Despite the supposed indirect, or
second order, effect through private law of fundamental rights in Europe, in
theory such a doctrine gives the government leeway to crack down on private autonomy whenever it desires. Rather we would propose that disputes
between private persons fail to raise constitutional issues. A minimum requirement of state action is needed in order to invoke the Constitution; such
a requirement serves as a vital prophylactic protecting the private legal
order from constitutional scrutiny and government overreaching.
We beg to disagree with Professors Irti and Caroni. Far from jettisoning the concept of the private legal order from our legal lexicon, we note
that the idea behind it is still very much alive in the civilian legal tradition
of Latin America. More often than not, special legislation respects the existing legal order; supplements existing legal precepts; or completes the
concise, clear, compact, intrinsically useful, and justified order embodied in
the civil law (based on Roman law).
Professor Alejandro Guzmdin Brito of the Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaiso shrewdly shoots back that special legislation in Latin
America seldom undermines, or is contrary to, the existing order of private
law. 64 As an example, he cites Chile's land reform legislation of 1967,65
enacted, and its implementation begun, by Salvador Allende, the democratically-elected socialist president, and summarily nullified by General
Augusto Pinochet's military government. This reform and its misguided
social policy did undermine the civil law-not through its expropriation of
large landholdings to redistribute the property to smaller farmers, which
follows a well-established legal doctrine squarely within the civil-law
(Roman law) tradition-but in instituting a varied regime of landholding
based on communal ownership models and the disappointed aspirations of
that long-lost socialist dawn.

63. See Ginter Diirig, Grundrechte und Zivilrechtsprechung [Basic Rights and Civil Jurisdiction],
in VOM BONNER GRUNDGESETZ ZUR GESAMTDEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNG 157-90 (Theodor Maunz ed.,

1956).
64. See Alejandro Guzmin Brito, Codficacion, Descodificacion y Recodificacion del Derecho
Civil Chileno, 90 REVISTA DE DERECHO Y JURISPRUDENCIA Y GACETA DE LOS TRIBUNALES 39 (1993)

(Chile); Alejandro Guzmhn Brito, La Codification Civil en Iberoamerica:Siglos XIXy XX, 55 ANUARIO
DE DERECHO CIVIL 15 (2002) (Chile).

65.

Ley de Reforma Agraria, No. 16.640 (1967).
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This Chilean professor of Roman law wryly comments that this reform and its misguided social policy harkens back to Europe's feudalistic
legal past. We must recall the resistance that Roman law evoked in earlymodem, or Renaissance-whatever you want to call it-Northern Europe,
when feudal law was sidestepped, the Roman law received, and Roman law
scholarship was looked at as unbrotherly and uncommunal. 6 6 Roman law
67
opposed social norms deeply rooted in Northern European feudal society.
Must we forget that Roman law laid the foundation for the rise of commer68
cial society?
In addition to decodification, private law in Latin America, as in
Europe, has undergone a process of recodification. Either through new
provisions consistently incorporated into codes or because of shifts away
from precise and extensive governmental regulation, which has been accomplished through statute or administrative oversight, some areas once
pulled out of the code through "decodification" may now return to the code
through "recodification." This may occur as socialist legislation is replaced
or transformed by more market-oriented governments. Thus, the law governing employment contracts might have first been located within the broad
contractual language of a civil code. Upon greater state regulation of employment, newer, highly-specific provisions would be reflected in the labor
code-the decodification stage. With a reduction of state oversight of labor
or the adaptation of newer provisions into civil code, employment contracts
may once again find their governing law located in the civil code-the
recodification stage. 6 9
Some scholars may venture to suggest that an ALACDE model law
and economics civil and commercial code, as a fascinating intellectual
odyssey, will by force have the de/merit of being openly ideological. Let us
turn the tables on all of these oh-so-intellectually-honest critics. Praxis is
the central problem of theory. Not only will a set of code provisions based
66. James Q. Whitman, The Disease of Roman law: A Century Later, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 227, 227-30 (1994); see also James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman law and the
Making of Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence, 105 YALE L. J. 1841 (1996).
67. HEINRICH BRUNNER, GRUNDZOGE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE [FUNDAMENTALS OF
GERMANY'S HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE] (1919).

68. It is imprecise to speak of the property absolutism of Roman law, despite the triptych ius
utendi,fruendi, et abutendi (the right to use, enjoy, and destroy). The Romans clearly took a cautious
and restrained view. Roman law imposed limits on the use and enjoyment of private property under
public policy rationales or with an eye to preserving the use, enjoyment, and value of neighboring
properties.
69. See CARLOS AUGUSTO RAMOS N&NEZ, CODIFICAC!ON, TECNOLOGiA Y POSTMODERNIDAD:

LA MUERTE DE UN PARADIGMA 82-85 (2000); Maria Luisa Murillo, The Evolution of Codification in
the Civil Law Legal System: Towards Decodification and Recodification, 11 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y

163, 177-81 (2001).
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on the principles of law and economics serve as a model for legislators and
codifiers to come, but also the provisions will serve to refine and concretize
ideas about law and economics generally. An ALACDE model civil and
commercial code will privatize, recodify, and deconstitutionalize private
law in Latin America. Latin American government officials privatized their
economies since the 1990s, forgetting that their legal systems had been
socialized, decodified and constitutionalized during much of the twentieth
century. Perhaps such a project will spur other schools of legal thought on
to proffer code provisions that reflect their own particular view of law.
How exciting to compare parallel provisions on, say, the nature of property,
drafted from a wide variety of perspectives. What language might critical
legal studies theorists and socialists settle on to define property? How
would code provisions on property reflect ideas of restitution for slavery or
racial oppression from a critical race or LatCrit theory perspective? How
would critical feminist theorists draft their provisions? What aspirations
might be reflected in realist provisions? Imagine what we would learn
about the nature of property, law, and ourselves with such a set of provisions. Our task at the moment, however, is to move forward with the contours of our own project.
Civilian legal methodology is presently at a point where it can co-opt
law and economics away from Anglo-American legal scholars. Let us explain: much legal scholarship in the United States is spinning its wheels.
Europeans and Latin Americans can make new contributions to the field.
European and Latin American civilian legal scholars are conversant with
the concept of the private legal order. For us, legal reasoning involves a
sort of structural intellectual exercise where we fit legal questions into a
wider framework of law and justice. The Germans even recognize das Postulat der Einheit der Rechtsordnung as a source of legal authority. However, no one in the civilian world is able to define exactly what is meant by
the private legal order. Here is where law and economics can have a major
impact in European and Latin American legal scholarship.
The economic approach to law reveals a wide panorama of just how
private property rights and the law of obligations, where social norms are
ineffective, redress informational asymmetries, align incentive effects,
allow for pricing mechanisms, permit credible commitments, reduce monitoring costs, mitigate governance costs and decentralize decision making
about resource allocation, and facilitate the channeling of savings into productive investment through financial intermediation. 70 The civilian concept
70. We do not attempt to survey the law and economics literature on private law. A few examples
suffice. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
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of the private legal order can even become a source of legal authority in the
future, not as the procedural instrumentalism of das Postulat der Einheit
der Rechtsordnung of German law, with its tone of social-scientific rationality at its blandest and most perfectly value-neutral, but as a well defined
and understood wealth-maximizing principle (based on ordinal, not cardinal, utility) underlying private law itself. Private law can move back into
the front and center of the legal order, instead of having the Constitution
and public law be the fulcrum of the legal order.
Through the private legal order, we get the benefits of a market economy. "The decentralised initiatives of thousands of individuals and companies develop new services and products that no government official could
imagine, let alone bring to market. ' 71 The role of government is limited to
resolving conflicts and fostering life and liberty; defining and defending
private property under the law; protecting the free and open exchange of
goods, services and ideas; and limiting private use of force and deception.
The economy becomes highly competitive as increased autonomy is ceded
to private firms and individuals, and bona fide markets for labor, capital,
and technology are developed. Increased competition brings the discipline
of free markets to all corners of the economy-every industry, every company, every worker, and every transaction. The private legal order is efficient because governance costs are low and incentive effects are high.

IV. DRAFTING THE CODE
A scholar will respond that the task of drafting of an ALACDE model
law and economics civil and commercial code is easier said than done.
Latin American countries have changed their constitutions with unusual
and bewildering alacrity. 72 Like the United States 215 years ago, the European Union is deep into its first constitutional convention, seeking to resolve the issues of federal and state power that Anglo-Americans are still
fighting over. Europe is undertaking a far-reaching political experiment
with a European constitution. Many scholars would not have recommended
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1999); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S457-58 (2002); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (2006).
71. Richard Epstein, Editorial, Free Markets Demand Protection, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 13,

2003, at 21. Professor Epstein has a long-standing interest in the economic analysis of Roman law, and
we owe a debt of gratitude to him for fruitful discussions. Frank Buckley is another Anglo-American
law and economics scholar with civilian interests, who has generously contributed to this proposal with

his focus on private law.
72. Mauricio Garcia-Villegas, Law as Hope: Constitutions, Courts, and Social Change in Latin
America, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 133, 140-42 (2004).
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such an undertaking, since it will secure aspirational or second-generation
rights and abstract constitutional legality as it is practiced in many European member countries today, and reduce the diachronic representativeness
of public law institutions. Si momentum requiris, circumspice! In contrast,
civil and commercial codes in Latin American countries have remained
substantially unchanged since their passage. 73 One reason is that the codes
are perceived as a restatement of legal science, explicated by treatise writers. Another reason is the daunting complexity of the codes themselves.
Civil and commercial codes are massive undertakings involving scrutiny of
all aspects of private law. However, new technologies make it easier to
rewrite and update codes. Computers and the use of the Internet and e-mail
allow scholars to work with large texts and to cooperate irrespective of
distances.
We must realize that we need to work together through the ALACDE,
rather than working alone as individual scholars, in our respective countries, or in self-imposed exile in the United States and elsewhere. The more
other Latin American scholars are empowered by their participation in the
ALACDE, the better off we are. As individual scholars, our drive for reform will remain ineffective and our efforts are likely to be rebuffed. Do
we not face disappointing limitations in our own countries? Do not nepotism, inefficacy, lack of funding, dilapidated infrastructure, mind-numbing
inefficiency, and multi-layered corruption rule the day? Do we not face in
Latin America an all-pervading, initiative-stifling culture apparently dedicated to preserving inefficiency and indecisiveness? It is important that
such an endeavor be inclusive, and allow the concerted participation of
other scholars, even if the result is less than cutting-edge legal science. A
code crowded with arguments in the overly mathematical style of modern
economics, which presents highly stylized models that only a few legal
scholars can understand, would have less impact than a code that simply
injects key law and economics concepts into legal doctrine at a very basic
level. Nonetheless, through such a code, the language of the law, and even
the terms of legal discourse, will have changed in Latin America. This in
itself is a great accomplishment, and more significant, than any a scholarly
work built on sensitivity to theoretical advance and on careful assessment
and use of data. The more mathematical and advanced scholarship may

73. See M.C. Mirow, Borrowing Private Law in Latin America: Andrs Bello's Use of the Code
Napol6on in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA. L. REV. 291 (2001); M.C. Mirow, The Code
Napol6on: Buried but Ruling in Latin America, 33 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 179, 191-94 (2005);
M.C. Mirow, The Power of Codification in Latin America: Sim6n Bolivar and the Code Napol6on, 8
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83 (2000) [hereinafter Mirow, Power of Codification].
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take place through the innovative e-journal model, 74 and this scholarship
may influence treatise writers who will write commentaries and annotations
to an ALACDE civil and commercial code, in a peculiarly civil-law fashion.
This proposal must be viewed as a shared academic enterprise that
would effectively bring us together and serve as a means of providing a
competitive edge to our national economies. In Latin America, there is an
urgent need to strengthen inter-university cooperation and to promote academic exchange. The grave problem of Latin American academe is that we
lack a wider scholarly community, such as exists in the United States or
Europe, and transnational academic exchange is quite limited. Even though
much individual effort is centered on intellectual production, we fail to read
each other's works and the fruits of this intellectual production are not
shared. The economic approach to law, because it is a new field capable of
advancing upon now-dominant doctrinaire approaches, can bring together
bright academics, who are in quite insular and marginal situations in each
respective Latin American country, and top legal scholars from the United
States. The ALACDE may take the lead in putting forth bold proposals for
the region. We envision this proposal in particular as a connector. It can be
the place where Latin America's many distinct legal academic communities, often walled off from one another by national borders, come together
on common ground. Inter-university cooperation between Anglo-American
and Latin American law faculties will be strengthened, and for the first
time there will be a wider Latin American academic community of legal
scholars, as opposed to the fragmented groups of scholars that exist now.
An ALACDE model civil and commercial code will raise our consciousness, further our knowledge, expand the network of scholars belonging to
the ALACDE, and develop leadership ability to transform the region. It
will set a new generation of civil-law scholars thinking together about how
they can work towards changes that will improve the region.
It is a cliche, but like all good clich6s, it is worth repeating: in order
for us really to "make that leap," we will need to establish a fundamental
change in the mindset of the people involved with the project. Scholars of
Latin American law frequently operate in an overbearingly closed-off academic environment, dominated by professor "barons" who treat their positions as feudal fiefdoms, in which researchers are not so much employed as
indentured. Is it any wonder that we often fail to provide new insights and
inject fresh ideas into academic discourse, or that the "army of consultants
74. David A. Rier, The Future ofLegal Scholarship and Scholarly Communication: Publication in
the Age of Cyberspace, 30 AKRON L. REV. 183 (1996).
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and staffers in the area of judicial administration" 75 at the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, the
United Nations Development Fund, and the Inter-American Development
Bank, who do not even hold academic appointments or enjoy prestige as
practitioners in their own countries, carry out often ill-conceived legal reforms at great expense in impoverished Latin American countries? We
need to stop jockeying for position among ourselves as leadership hopefuls, 7 6 and agree to pursue a common agenda, and turn to educating our
fellow legal scholars about law and economics. We must be inclusive and
allow for participation in the ALACDE, where "inclusion" will not be a
catchword, but will be a passion. That must be our preoccupation, our plan
of action. Does anyone seriously doubt that urgent action is needed?
Precisely what is likely to fascinate and inform the civil-law attorney
may be unlikely to attract anywhere near as much interest from the common-law attorney. We ask common-law scholars to acknowledge their
need to keep an open mind. James Gordley has argued that codification
interferes with the work of legal scholars. 7 7 Though we fail to see how his
particular criticisms can be extended to our ALACDE model codes, which
are meant to foster greater discussion and debate on law and economics
among Latin American scholars, his cautionary notes may be worth reflecting on after we finish our project, and may very well address core problems
that must be confronted in our legal system. Gordley argues that when current civil and commercial law is consolidated into codes, the law becomes
etched in stone. Accordingly, legal institutions are fossilized and become
impediments to legal development. Codification in Anglo-America has, of
course, taken a subtly different form and use-the interpretive guides formally known as legal restatements. 78 These codifications have no force of
law on their own, but they have exerted a substantial impact on the development of the common law and on related scholarly treatises, which are
75. Luz Estella Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: JudicialReform in Latin America, 30 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 345, 374-76 (2000).
76. There is, of course, a link between aspirations for leadership and the international institutions
just mentioned. "International strategies refer to the ways that national actors seek to use foreign capital,
such as resources, degrees, contacts, legitimacy, and expertises-which we pluralize in order to highlight the competing forms and technologies-to build their power at home." DEZALAY & GARTH,
PALACE WARS, supra note 33, at 7.
77. James Gordley, Codification and Legal Scholarship, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735 (1998); see
James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
140 (1981).
78. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Reflections on Codification and Case Law in the TwentyFirst Century, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 667-69 (1998). In restatements, a group of top legal scholars
boil down the best judicial decisions from throughout the United States into a set of rules that are
relatively easy to look up, understand, and apply.
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free to embrace or reject restatement teachings. Gordley himself would not
argue that North American restatements have hindered the development of
legal scholarship in the United States. In the past, these works have proved
highly influential and have contributed to legal scholarship in the United
States.
A civil or commercial code is certainly more than simply a filing system for legal doctrines, or a giant clothes rack on which to hang legal doctrines so that they look tidier. A legal scholar who has not been trained in
the civil-law system may not appreciate fully, or even adequately, what is
going on under the rubric of the private legal order. The unified view of the
legal system does not spring from whether a doctrinal compendium is the
work of one or a multitude of stylistically-challenged treatise-writers.
Something so complex as Roman law was obviously not the work of one
person. It is the result of a constantly refined tradition. The debate today is
not over whether to suppress private property (that argument is now historical), but over the kind of institutional structures that should run alongside markets. There is just too much at stake to let the civilian concept of
the legal order pass. What is at stake is whether the concept of a legal system that recognizes and upholds private property and contractual exchange
will have any remaining meaning at all.
The concept of the legal order was superfluous, redundant, and even
unnecessary under socialism, where social coordination was achieved under the micro-managing, heavy-handed control of the central government.
Rather than through the certainty of interpretation and consistency of application under an existing legal order, socialism operated through "direct
political control" and central planning, by the supremacy of bureaucratic
centralism over freedom. Law itself became an instrument with which to
smash the enemies of the socialist state. Nor do socialist utopias seriously
consider a need for the concept. Under Marxist theory, the police, the
'79
courts-the law itself-"wither away."
Latin Americans, in the twenty-first century, must move from a public-law-centered order of aspirational or declaratory law to a private-lawcentered order of transformative law. Markets empower people as much as
democracy enfranchises them. Today positive second-generation rights
may answer a very atavistic part of ourselves, the deep-rooted koinonial
instinct to satisfy the known needs of our fellows. Yet as F. A. Hayek understood, this human inclination corrupts or destroys the market's rational79. Evgeny Pashukanis argues that both law and the state will progressively diminish as socialism
develops. EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY (Barbara Einhorn trans.,
Chris Arthur ed. 1978).
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ity, which is based on impersonal exchanges between relative strangers.
The Constitution's declaration of so-called second- or third-generation
rights ("freedoms to" as opposed to "freedoms from") is well-intentioned,
but it misleadingly implies the possibility of socialist utopian fantasies. 80
V.

FACING THE CURRENT CRISIS

With Latin America struggling to survive global financial turmoil, the
Bretton Woods institutions-the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF)-are often (and often unfairly) the target of severe criticism in
the region. About fifteen years after countries in Latin America, including
Argentina and Mexico, opened their economies to global markets, a majority of citizens have yet to experience the benefits of the market economy.
Conditions are bleak for Latin America. Unemployment is rising, wages
and living standards are falling, and with the economic reversals have come
social unrest and signs that economic reforms are being stymied. Many
developing countries having IMF-sponsored privatization programs have
experienced anti-privatization demonstrations. A new consensus in Latin
America is plain to see. It questions the wisdom of the economic model
currently embraced, which provides policy prescriptions that seem to
worsen the already-bad situation in these countries-liberalizing prices,
opening up markets, privatizing state enterprises, raising interest rates, and
reining in public spending. 8 1 However, this does not mean developing
economies should turn their backs on the capital markets or abandon the
goal of opening markets. We simply must insist that economic development in developing countries requires an acceptance of the benefits of the
market economy. 82 Stalinist central planning sought to direct the national
economy from the center. But its collapse in the former communist states
has been even more complete than the historical failure (and current menace) in Latin America of leftist populism-with its spiraling tendency toward demagoguery.

80. See generally 2 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL

JUSTICE (1976).
81. To be sure, Latin American economists were forced to try something new after the disastrous
1980s, characterized by runaway de't and inflation, economic recession, and high unemployment.
Entering the 1990s, planners opted to abandon protectionism and embrace economic orthodoxy. They
cut social spending, liberalized trade laws, sold off state companies, and lowered tariffs. Governments
eliminated subsidies on food, transportation, and electricity.
82. To succeed in the new millennium, we must not abandon this economic orthodoxy of free
trade, privatization, and global economic integration. We must continue our move away from statecentered economics.
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Those who oppose the Bretton Woods institutions include the fringe
extremists, the moderately critical, and everything between. 83 The leftist
mainstream in Latin America, long suspicious that the IMF is simply a tool
for U.S. economic orthodoxy, argues that its harsh policy prescriptions
have forced millions into poverty and unemployment. Clearly, the interface
between national economies and the international capital markets is a potential danger area for any government. 84 However, rather than Latin
American governments being unduly cautious before they open up, governments must take a more comprehensive perspective of developmentone that encompasses economic and structural legal issues. Along with
orthodox economic policy prescriptions in Latin America, legal prescriptions for how to make the law work best must be proposed, discussed, legislated, implemented, and followed-up in virtually all Latin American
countries; economics must be partnered with law and economics.
More is needed in Latin America than a rerun of the property-title
revolutions that enriched Western Europe and America in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, or General Douglas MacArthur's magnificent
property-titling program in post-War Japan. 85 Something a bit more substantial is needed. In Latin America during the twenty-first century, we
must privatize-and deconstitutionalize-the private legal order along with
economic liberalization and privatization.
Robert D. Cooter and Hans-Bernd Schifer have argued against the socalled "Washington consensus"-under which Washington-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the
U.S. Treasury prescribe active government-led strategies for foreign investment-driven development to improve the economies of developing
economies-and support their arguments by stating that economic growth
arises from private information to which the government is not privy. 86

83. Timothy A. Canova, Financial Liberalization, International Monetary Dis/order, and the
NeoliberalState, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1279,1281-83 (2000).
84. A well-capitalized and well-regulated banking system is a prerequisite for capital account
liberalization; this is the hard lesson taught by Mexico's financial crisis of 1994. Foreign bond markets
are treacherous for any country without a robust fiscal position; this is the hard lesson taught by Argentina's debt crisis of 2002. The latter's crisis also demonstrates the urgent need for some form of bankruptcy protection for sovereigns. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither Order Nor Chaos: The Legal Structure
of Sovereign Debt Workouts, 53 EMORY L.J. 657 (2004).
85. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 10 (2000). The Peruvian Marxist organization, Shining Path, has
paid a tribute of sorts to de Soto's anti-poverty activism: two unsuccessful attempts to assassinate him.
86. Robert D. Cooter, Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations 4 (Berkeley Program in
Law & Econ., Latin Am. & Caribbean Law & Econ. Ass'n [ALACDE] Ann. Papers, Paper No. 15,
2005), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1014&context'bple.
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Economists need to work with economic-minded lawyers. 87 This need has
already been expressed, if indirectly, in the works of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 88 Their empirical work suggests that the legal system plays a powerful role in
determining national economic development. Alas, the evidence is there!
Now a generation of legal scholars has to pick up the baton left by these
business school professors and run with the same panache. Once we start
regurgitating the same doctrinaire scholarship, that will be the end of the
ALACDE.
The problem we face in connection with the Latin American civil-law
legal system is not one of putting in place investor-friendly laws, tailoring a
more investor-friendly legal regime, or creating the most investor-friendly
legal environment. It is not one of the infusion of capital through foreign
direct investment. Nor is it one of international aid programs designed to
fill in financing gaps as measured by the sophomoric application of out-ofdate and out-of-touch growth models. 89 Instead, the problem we face is a
failure of the legal system to ensure law and order so that property and
contract rights are respected, as well as a failure to implement the rule of
law through a system of checks and balances aimed at limiting the abuse of
state power. It is the failure, particularly telling in terms of the deficiencies
of the legal system as a whole, to provide the legal infrastructure necessary
for markets to function. It is, moreover, the general failure of internal financial intermediation in Latin American countries.
Financial intermediation occurs both through debt and equity markets
(between short-term capital supply and long-term capital demand). A lack
of access to capital means that even where entry costs are relatively low,
entry into too much economic activity becomes cost-prohibitive for people
with wealth constraints, and there is less shadow competition around the
87. More is needed in Latin America than a re-run of property-title revolutions. Economists-and
in particular, Hernando de Soto, who seems uninterested in law and economics-need to collaborate
with economic-minded lawyers.
88. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny,
Investor Protection and CorporateGovernance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57
J. FIN. 1147 (2002); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Legal Determinantsof External Finance,52 J. FIN. 1131, 1132 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal
Determinants].
89. See generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH (2001). The Harrod-

Domar model of economic growth has been used naively to predict how much people must save and
invest to keep an economy growing. See Evsey D. Domar, Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and
Employment, 14 ECONOMETRICA 137 (1946); R.F. Harrod, An Essay in Dynamic Theory, 49 ECON. J.
14 (1939). For examples of economic growth models, see also Robert M. Solow, A Contributionto the
Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65 (1956); Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the
Aggregate Production Function,39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957).
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entire economy to impose market discipline. Economics textbooks all suggest that the lack of competitive market discipline ultimately leads to
higher prices and lower quality. The lack of shadow competition also hobbles Latin American countries with inefficiency, listlessness, underemployment, an informal economy, lost economic opportunities, lack of
global competitiveness, nepotism, cronyism, promotions and rewards based
on "know-who" rather than "know-how," unnecessarily high staff levels,
and rent-seeking politics-all leading to a lack of real choice in products
and services and low national job-creation figures.
Ineffectively, governments in Latin America-saturated with statist
culture-step in as financial intermediaries to fill the void, channeling domestic saving away from taxpayers and to a compendium of government
waste, mismanagement, and pilfering of the public purse on an exceptional
scale. 90 High deficit financing requirements further lead to the unfortunate
practices that permeate the economy: uncontrolled tax evasion, standard
double accounting, and a habit of under-reporting payrolls and understating
revenues and profits. Investors are denied transparent, consistent, and reliable financial information; valuation and pricing of the assets and liabilities
of companies become problematic for passive investors. All of the above
point to the biggest myths there are-namely, that equity markets exist in
many Latin American countries, other than equity markets for bonds or
securitized debt instruments, and that a privatized system of Social Security
may create them.
The full scope of financial intermediation is path dependent on our legal system, which is a product of sixteen centuries of Western life and experience and legal history. We may expect to fill in a very big hole in our
understanding of how the legal system and financial intermediation fit together only through the study of comparative law and economics of the
private legal order. A new-generation ALACDE model code is a step in
that direction. Such a code may offer a larger and much more integrated
view of the components of the private legal order. Comparative law and
economics will grow substantially with the drafting of an ALACDE model
civil and commercial code for Latin American and Caribbean countries,
which will innovate upon legal doctrines in the civil-law tradition. The
process must repair, rather than replace, useful elements already extant in
the tradition. Legal transplants become ineffectual and largely inoperative

90. Antitrust enforcement is a self-contradictory instrument for promoting competition in Latin
America insofar as what stifles competition in the region is state intervention in the economy. Rather
than enforce antitrust laws, governments must reduce government obstacles to competition in the
private sector.

2008]

A PROPOSAL FOR MODEL CODES

because they fail to fit into the existing legal order and spawn very high
transaction costs (as economists call them), owing to the differences in
aims, cultures, and legal traditions. 9 1
VI. PROJECTING THE CODE

In what follows in this paper, we will suggest some broad outlines for
a new-generation ALACDE model law and economics civil and commercial code for Latin American countries. The codes must not be a vehicleunder any circumstances-for legal borrowing from other legal systems,
nor for the legal transplantation of common-law doctrines into the civil
law. Instead, civil-law doctrines have to be modified and even expanded,
recreated with doctrinal consistency, tweaked for contemporary tastes,
culled from Latin American doctrinal writings, retouched, and sometimes
recast, constructed out of Roman law sources with contemporary resonances, and combined, merged, and modified with economic concepts and
phrases.
Throughout this proposal, we have asserted that this project must
adapt law and economics to Latin America, that it must take shape along
civilian lines and within civilian moulds. Following established structures
within the framework of private legal ordering, this project is best viewed
as a continuation of the well-established tradition of codification in Latin
America. Successful codifications in the region occur when a particular
constellation of factors are present. A certain dissatisfaction with or perceived need for reform of present law often sparks the process. Nonetheless, such hopes for change are not enough. Successful codification projects
take root in periods of political and economic stability. They also require a
sufficient number of dedicated and legally talented individuals who have
incentives to make a new code a priority. Codes in the region historically
have been the work of a single individual who drafts for and guides the
project under the auspices of a legislative committee. The role of the key
figure should not be underestimated. 9 2 Adequate sources and resources for
93
such a project are also necessary.
Many of these hurdles are lowered by the collective nature of this project. By using blogs and web pages for the project, the drafters and commentators can intellectually gather at the same space with little cost.
91. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES MEANS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW:
CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATION LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLOMBIA 271-79(1980).
92. M.C. Mirow, Individual Experience in Legal Change: Exploring a Neglected Factor in Nineteenth-Century Latin American Codification, 11 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 301 (2005).
93. See, e.g., Mirow, Power of Codification,supra note 73, at 108-12.
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Sources and ideas are easily accessed and shared. Nonetheless, it is understood that these model codes are far from legislation. Special interests and
individual political forces often greatly transform pristine proposed laws
94
into something quite different from the text and intent of the drafters.
This project's methodology makes an important contribution to law
reform in the region. We recognize that there are aspects of legal systems
in Latin America that work. We view these areas of adequate functioning
as "pockets of legality." Law reform projects within the region frequently
try to offer remedies based on an incorrect assumption that entire legal
systems are completely broken and beyond repair and that whatever ruins
of law and order remain should be razed to the ground. These projects
would then build new edifices from scratch. We disagree with this approach and find more in many countries to provide sound starting points for
incremental, effective, and responsible reform tailored to the historical and
cultural aspects of law in the region. These pockets of legalitycodification, the private legal order, Roman law-provide the existing
foundation for our proposal.
Latin American legal scholars must work within a mould steeped in
tradition but not bound by it. The pandect system must be maintained, as
this is such a well-understood part of the legal ordering. The civil code
must be organized along the general lines of Gaius' and Justinian's Institutes: persons, things, and modes of acquisition (reducing the scope of the
law of successions, expanding the scope of the law of obligations), but not
including actions or procedure, 95 and divided into three books, each subdivided into titles, which, in turn, may be further subdivided into chapters,
and the chapters into sections. The commercial code must cover merchants,
company law, and commercial obligations, and may be expanded to include a variety of non-contractual commercial subjects such as fidei commissa, industrial property, tax law, negotiable instruments, securities
regulation, and unfair competition.
We suggest that the basic concepts of law and economics may be
readily transferred into the ALACDE codes, beginning with the economic

94. The authors thank Professor Alejandro Garro for reminding us of this aspect of the legislative
process, particularly in the Latin American context.
95. The proposed law-and-economics codes will restate substantive civil and commercial law;
codes of procedure would require greater innovativeness and creativity, and may be embarked upon
later. These codes would move toward privatized or private-led models of adjudication. Our civil
procedure, ironically, stems from the canon law's inquisitorial process instead of the Roman law's
adversarial process.
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understanding of property rights. 96 Another major line of economic thought
to be incorporated is the economic distinction between property and liability rules. In the law of obligations, delicts are areas that must be enlarged,
while always drawing from or innovating on Roman-law concepts. As the
system for civil extracontractual responsibility is strengthened, then the
need for the enforcement of penalty clauses in the civil code is undermined. 97 As practitioners in Latin America are aware, when faced with the
inefficacy of enforcement of contractual promises, civil matters are too
often transformed into penal complaints. 98 The strengthening of civil contractual and extracontractual liability 99 (delicts), may lead to a "depenalization" in Latin American countries. It is an irony that in the Roman law,
private redress carried quasi-penal sanctions, while Latin American penal
law punishes wrongdoers and redresses injuries. Rather than a law of delict
or civil wrongs redressable by compensation, we get a different order of
public regulatory law under the weight of bureaucratic inertia (or worse)
where civil liability follows penal liability, where everything is penalized
and debtors are subjected to debtors' prisons.
The ALACDE codes may present agency theory as a set of tools that
can be used to address a fundamental issue that continues to underpin the
civilian legal tradition-the underdevelopment of agency law in Roman
law. A modem civilian doctrine of agency law will be built through the use
of the tools of agency theory, and a modem civil-law doctrine offides will
be incorporated into company law to support investor relations. Fides when
acting on one's own behalf or for others may be of a contractual- and
quasi-contractual nature as in communio. 100 Courts in Latin America
should exercise wide latitude in protecting the interests of minority shareholders in private companies' 0 1 as well as in a wide assortment of other
96. A largely unrecognized fact in law and economic literature is that the tragedy of the commons
has long been a trope of the Roman lawyers. See FERNANDO VAZQUEZ DE MENCHACA, II
CONTROVERSIARUM ILLVSTRIVM ALIARVMQVE VSV FREQVENTIVM LIBRI TRES, at lxxxviiii (1564).
97. See Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated
Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 651-55 (2001); Ugo Mattei, The ComparativeLaw and Economics of
Penalty Clauses in Contracts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 427, 434-38, 441 (1995). See generally Edward A.
Tomlinson, Tort Liability in Francefor the Act of Things: A Study of Judicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L.
REV. 1299 (1988).
98. STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW 560 (2004).
99. See Tomlinson, supra note 97.
100. See Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 303
(1999).
101. Latin American commercial law provides weak legal protections for minority shareholders,
which include supermajority voting rules and allocating directors to large-block minority shareholders.
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, CorporateOwnership Around the
World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 511-12 (1999); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1151-52 (1998); La Porta et al., Legal
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relationships that involve Roman lawfides. Legal doctrine may examine in
what relationships fides exists, exactly what constitutes a betrayal offides
and the legal consequences generated by such a violation. Fides will
probably be found to exist in fiduciarius/idiecommissarius,mandator/mandatary, tutor/ward, corporate director/officer-corporation and
shareholders,1 02 socius/societas, and major shareholders/minority shareholders relationships (the categories should not be exclusive). When the
incentive structure is efficient, courts should uphold bene agere to mitigate
the rigors of civil and commercial law in accordance with underlying social
norms. 103 It cannot be denied that conducting business with and on behalf
of other people involves uncertainty and risk. This is why the Roman consensual contracts are frequently open-ended and rife with gaps (incomplete
contracts). 104 In civil and commercial life, we are called upon to act with
bona fides. However, the mechanics of building cooperation and fides
among economic actors is hard enough and monitoring and evaluating the
performance of people we rely on is costly. For all we know, they may
shirk their responsibilities or misappropriate our assets. Accordingly, courts
may be called on to make ex post determinations regarding whether people
have acted contra bonam fidem, which are necessarily contextdependent. 10 5 Moreover, as noted above, some relationships in whichfides
exists require greater measures of loyalty, candor, due care, and information from people willing to respond to and promote the interests of others,
even at cost to their own interests-levels much higher than the ubiquitous
Treu und Glauben required between parties to an arms-length commercial

Determinants,supra note 88. Beyond these basic measures, the law allows for the rights of inspection,
proposal, and withdrawal.
102. Latin American commercial law establishes personal liability for company directors and
officers. However, these rules cannot really be enforced except in exceptional circumstances, which
makes them illusory and theoretical. Lastly, a lack of liquidity of shares, and a shortage of market
makers, mean it is difficult for shareholders to exit a corporation, which is scarcely effective in imposing market discipline on managers. Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 540 (1995).
103. In a civil society,fides as a legal concept should be both essential and seen as an entry point
for efficient social norms into commercial law. See Robert D. Cooter, DecentralizedLaw for a Complex
Economy: The StructuralApproach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643,
1694-96 (1996).
104. It is difficult to specify all the possible outcomes ex ante, or to know which details will be
important ex ante.
105. In cases of apparent conflicts of interest, self-dealing, and misappropriation, the courts may
require people to prove that they acted with fides. It is essential that the burden of proof shifts. Robert
Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship:Its Economic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1991). Different standards of care are appropriate in different
relationships. For example, a tutor often is required to act with diligentiaquam in suis in managing the
assets of his ward, whereas the officer of a corporation may only be liable for culpa lata.
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transaction. 106 Courts in Latin America must create ex ante incentives for
people to act appropriately in order to support civil and commercial relationships and investor relations in the region. The ius honorarium adiuvandi, vel supplendi, vel corrigendiiuris civilis was perennially relevant to
Rome's increasingly complex commercial life.
The two-fold division of private law has been current since the latemedieval period, when the first commercial laws were adopted in Italian
cities as leges speciales to regulate trade. A useful reorganization would be
to group secured transactions together in both the civil and commercial
codes. Security interests are the modem equivalent of the ancient practice
of exchanging hostages to cement bonds of fealty. The assets pledged as
collateral will be more valuable to debtors than creditors (to the hostagegivers than the hostage-takers), so civilian courts must be willing to enforce
10 7
the forfeiture of collateral despite the prohibition of leges commissorice.
Commercial and securities laws provide a legal platform to facilitate financial intermediation through equity. These laws offer a range of protections
to aid the liquidity and value of shares, including limiting liability, restricting attempts to limit the transferability of shares as well as protecting market makers from insider trading, 108 requiring disclosure of essential
information by publicly-traded companies, and protecting the interests of
minority shareholders from tunneling and asset shifting to and from associated companies.
To appeal to a Latin American audience, full respect must be given to
the most basic distinctions of the Roman-law based system. Thus, the classical Roman law classification of contracts into nominate and innominate
requires that both civil and commercial codes have articles that allow parties to break out of the usual moulds and design atypical contracts. Much
commercial activity is hindered because contracts and legal entities in the
civil world are pigeonholed by default contractual forms and rules with a
long history. The nature of contracts is defined by legal custom and legal
doctrine, and enforced by the notary publics who may redraft documents as
they are entered into public records, or by judges who are prone to redefine
legal arrangements to fit usual moulds.
106. See RUDOLF MEYER,
RECHTSTRADITION (1994).
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107. CODE THEOD. 3.2.1; see Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor
Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 731-32 (1989).
108. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities
Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006). However, lower standards of disclosure may impact market makers more
than insider trading. Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A CriticalEvaluation ofAdverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REv. 83, 133 (2004). See HENRY G. MANNE,
INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 77-91 (1966).
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The French Code Civil expressly disallows precedential force. 109 In
stark contrast, an ALACDE model civil and commercial code will authorize use of prior judicial decisions as persuasive authority. This new judicial
authority should not be feared; the persuasive authority of prior judicial
decisions is narrow and fact specific. Moreover, it is possible to incorporate
Llewellynian hermeneutics and situation-sense, through customary law or
reasonable standards, into an ALACDE model civil and commercial code,
and resurrect if not reinvent nearly defunct casuistic devices that perhaps
date back to antiquity, or our vigorous Castilian-Roman traditions. 1 0 The
idea of fides in Roman law, and the ex post oversight of Roman prcetors
and cediles, should provide a model for reform of civil-law systems of today. " 'I

If the ALACDE codes are ever adopted by a Latin American or Caribbean country, the Allgemeiner Teil must clarify that the binding authority
of the codes-that is, their possible recognition as positive law-derives
not from the will of elected representatives, but from how the pieces of the
private legal order fit together as interpreted by judges and case law. 112
Rather than the legal order being a subsidiary source of law as in the German Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch, it will be front and center now. The articles
themselves will serve as an interpretive guide for judges to the content of
the legal order. Law and economics scholarship will shed light on the private legal order in traditional civilian fashion. Accordingly, rather than
detailed legal rules, sound legal doctrines based on the merger of Roman
law with law and economics will be explicated by scientific treatises.

109. C. civ. arts. 5,1351 (Fr.).
110. See LOS C6DIGOS ESPAfROLES: CONCORDADOS Y ANOTADOS, vols. 2-5 (Antonio de San
Martin ed., 2d ed. 1872) (reprinting the C6digo de las Siete Partidas).
111. We are, of course, aware of the complex nature of the claim. "Cujas (the story may be apocryphal), when asked to apply his learning to contemporary problems, would reply merely: 'Quid hoc ad
edictum praetoris?' It was a heroic answer, for in the name of pure scholarship he was in effect denying
European civilization the use of one of the principal canons by which she was accustomed to guide
herself." J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH
HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 10-11 (1987).

112. Only now, in this first decade of the twenty-first century, may law and economics have finally
made important inroads in setting forth a complete theory of law-making. See Juan Javier del Granado,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Reasoning (Berkeley Program in Law & Econ., ALACDE, Paper No.
Jan4_07, 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=959308. See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S
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CONCLUSION

It is high time that we realize that it is precisely the scientific nature of
our new economic understanding of legal institutions, a new legal science,
which will allow us to craft new legal institutions within existing frameworks rather than jettisoning parts of our legal system and filling in the
gaps with foreign doctrines that do not fit into the existing legal order. Now
is the moment, we suggest, when the academic interest of economicminded lawyers in Latin America with a stake in the region must be transformed into a more relevant and immediate timetable for action. We must
expand our pockets of legality. Legal scholars have an obligation to do
work that is not merely interesting as an intellectual enterprise but also
helps the region to govern itself.

